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Abstract: Being a feminist in the contemporary
Canadian context, post-Ghomeshi, can lead to
existential crises. In this paper I investigate this
relationship of feminist activism and reality, men’s
rights activism (MRA) and surrealism, and the
Absurd via the work of surrealist novelist Franz
Kafka. While Kafka’s The Trial is popularly
understood as an allegory for the alienation and
pains of bureaucracy and modernity, I posit a new
interpretation of the story as a men’s rights
perspective of sexual assault allegations. I use
Shoshana Felman’s theory of integrated literary and
legal visions to read Kafka’s The Trial against men’s
rights discourses regarding sexual assault allegations.
I find this theory of evidence and repetitions across
the disciplines of art (Kafka) and law (the Ghomeshi
trial) useful as analytical sites for critically engaging
with men’s rights discourses about sexual assault
allegations. I demonstrate how The Trial can be
interpreted as a representation of the phenomenon
of sexual assault allegations according to men’s rights
discourses, and demonstrate how these discourses are
just as surreal as Kafka’s story. Through the
Ghomeshi verdict I will demonstrate how these
surrealist fantasies impact real-world sexual assault
accusations, trials, and court decisions.
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Ifmen define situations as real,
They are real in their consequences
—W. I. Thomas (in Goffman 1974, 1 )
Introduction
Being a feminist in the contemporary Canadian
context, after the sexual assault trial of the popular
radio host Jian Ghomeshi, can lead to existential
crises. To be a feminist has always necessitated an
intimate connection to the Absurd; that is, engaging
with patriarchal logics and justifications for
oppression is to engage with bizarre understandings of
the causes and realities of violence against women. In
this paper, I investigate this relationship of feminist
activism and reality, men’s rights activism (MRA) and
surrealism, and the Absurd via the work of the
surrealist novelist Franz Kafka.
Kafka’s work permeates Western literature and
cultural memory to the point where even those who
have not read Kafka are familiar with the themes and
style of his writings. Franz Kafka’s contribution to
literature, discourse and theory, and popular culture is
clearly demonstrated with the adjective Kafkaïen
(Kafkaesque) , which has permeated the cultural
lexicon to take on meaning “the pejorative
connotation of describing an absurd situation in
general” (Bogaerts 2014, 70) . Kafka’s novel The Trial
(1968) is a work of narrative fiction that documents
the surrealist journey of Joseph K., a man accused of
and charged with an unknown crime. Joseph K. (also
written simply as “K.”) must navigate a labyrinthine
criminal justice system, and is eventually executed for
whatever it is he may or may not have done. In
Kafka’s infamous style the temporality, context, and
meaning of the plot is purposefully vague and has
been widely interpreted since its original publication
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in 1925 (with the first English translation appearing
in 1937) .
While the story is popularly understood as an
allegory for the alienation and pains of bureaucracy
and modernity, I posit a new interpretation ofThe
Trial as a men’s rights perspective of sexual assault
allegations. There are few feminist or gendered
readings of Kafka’s stories, let alone ofThe Trial and
“Before the Law.” I argue that the discourse put
forth by men’s rights activists1 regarding the reality
of sexual assault allegations is not grounded in
reality; it is a fantasy and also absurd. I utilize
Shoshana Felman’s theory of integrated literary and
legal visions to read Kafka’s The Trial against men’s
rights discourses regarding sexual assault allegations.
I conclude with the court decision for the Ghomeshi
trial to demonstrate the surrealism not only of the
novel but also of the socio-legal status of sexual
violence in the contemporary Canadian context.
On October 14, 2014, Jian Ghomeshi, the
prominent host of the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation’s (CBC) radio show on popular culture
called Q, publicly announced he was taking a leave.
Two days later the CBC terminated his
employment. On October 27, Ghomeshi responded
by filing a $50 million wrongful dismissal lawsuit,
claiming discrimination based on his private sexual
practices and false allegations by an ex-partner
(Coulling & Johnston 2017, 2) . More public
accusations by other women followed and
Ghomeshi dropped his lawsuit against the CBC on
November 25. On November 26, the police laid
four charges of sexual assault and one count of
overcoming resistance by choking (Coulling &
Johnston 2017, 2) . Later, police would lay three
more charges of sexual assault; the Crown would
drop two of those charges (Coulling & Johnston
2017, 2) . Ghomeshi entered a plea of not guilty for
all six charges. On March 24, 2016, Jian Ghomeshi
was acquitted of all charges. In their research on
public discourses surrounding the trial, Ryan
Coulling and Mathew Johnston note that there were
largely two camps of commentators on the
Ghomeshi trial: one believed the victims to be women
who had survived sexual assault and the other
believed the women were jilted lovers looking for
revenge (Coulling & Johnston 2017, 3) . Indeed, the
Ghomeshi trial seemed to be particularly open to
diverse readings, in part because there were a number
of issues regarding lack of evidence and inconsistences
in testimony by the victims—all of which were given
as reasons for the judge’s finding in the case (Coulling
& Johnston 2017, 3) .
Theory
This paper, borrowing from the work of Shoshana
Felman on narrative and legal repetitions, reads
narrative fiction through and across a legal court
decision. Felman proposes a theory of legal repetition
and “integrate[s] a literary vision with a legal vision,
with the intention of confronting evidence in law and
evidence in art” (2002, 54) . Specifically, Felmen uses
the O.J. Simpson trial and Tolstoy’s novella The
Kreutzer Sonata, read in conversation, as the site of
this integrated literary and legal vision. She notes:
The dialogue between the disciplines of law
and literature has so far been primarily
thematic . . . when not borrowing the tools of
literature to analyze (rhetorically) legal
opinions, scholars in the field of law and
literature most often deal with the explicit,
thematized reflection (or ‘representation’) of the
institutions of the law in works of the
imagination, focusing on the analysis of
fictional trials in a literary plot and on the
psychology or sociology of literature characters
whose fate or whose profession ties them to the
law. (Felman 2002, 55)
Felman’s approach breaks from this tradition by
analyzing both real and comparable impacts and
historical reception of the real court trial and the
fictional trial, a juxtaposition she admits is quite bold
(Felman 2002, 55) . Felman proposes a theory of “the
phenomenality of structural juridical repetitions as
internal to the logic of specific legal cases, or as a legal
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outcome of the (literary/psychoanalytic principle of
the) traumatic narratives that constitute . . . at once
the story and the actual criminal case” (Felman
2002, 56) . Felman takes seriously both the narratives
of the fictional and non-fictional trial while
simultaneously examining the cultural impact of
both texts without privileging law over literature or
vice versa.
This theory of evidence and repetitions across the
disciplines of art (Kafka) and law (the Ghomeshi
trial) presents useful analytical sites for critically
engaging with men’s rights discourses about sexual
assault allegations. Through this theoretical
framework, The Trial can be interpreted as a
representation of the phenomenon of sexual assault
allegations according to men’s rights discourses and
demonstrate how these discourses are equally as
surreal as Kafka’s story. Through the Ghomeshi
verdict, I assert how these surrealist fantasies
influence real-world sexual assault accusations, trials,
and court decisions.
Truth and Narrative Fiction
A significant contribution to the vast amount of
writing about and analysis of Kafka’s stories can be
attributed to what has been called the “universal
appeal” of his work—the vagueness of the
characters, context, and plot that allows readers to
easily identify with and project their own self,
feelings, or fantasies into/onto the story. However,
there is something to be said of analyzing Kafka in
context:
Kafka is more valuable when we look at him
in his multiple ties and connections. I insist
that ifwe truly want to consider Kafka a
writer of a somewhat universal appeal, and
not merely a provincial product of a certain
time and place than we must look carefully at
these ties and at these contexts. Parallels with
other writers, movements, techniques do not
diminish Kafka, on the contrary, they
emphasize his value and his merits for a
significant diversity of readers in a significant
diversity ofmanners. (Virgil 2005, 370)
Thus, while Kafka is a useful case study for examining
the socio-political context of early twentieth century
Prague, of the Jewish diaspora, or of the complexities
of a Jew writing in German in Prague during the
interwar period, the timeless feel of his stories
manages to speak to readers across contexts. This text
may speak to some readers of alienation and the pains
of state bureaucracies, but it speaks to me as a
narrative about sexual assault, of a cultural
misunderstanding of who constitutes the “victim” of
sexual violence and any resulting interactions with the
criminal justice system, especially the victimhood
narratives ofmen’s rights activism.
Men’s Rights Discourses: Surrealism &
Reality
Men’s gendered activism originally rose out of the
feminist movement in the 1960s, but eventually
succumbed to internal tensions and split into two
separate branches over internal tensions in the 1970s.
The first branch, men’s liberation2 discourses,
“acknowledged that sexism had been a problem for
women and that feminism was a necessary social
movement to address gender inequalities,” and
stressed how patriarchy also harmed men’s emotional
lives, health, and relationships (Messener 1998, 256) .
The other branch was an overtly anti-feminist men’s
rights movement. This second kind of movement,
which includes “men’s rights activists” (MRAs),3
focuses on hegemonic understandings of masculinity
and disputed or denied feminist claims that patriarchy
privileged men via the systemic oppression of women
(Messener 1998, 256) . In this paper, my historical
context is limited to this second branch of men’s
gendered activism as it is central to MRA discourses
of sexual assault allegations as represented both in
Kafka and the Ghomeshi trial.
By the 1980s, MRA discourse had become
increasingly and overtly angry and anti-feminist.
Feminism came to be viewed as “women’s plot to
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cover up the reality that it is actually women who
have the power and men who are most oppressed by
current gender arrangements,” as was exemplified by
men’s lower life span, health problems, military
conscription, divorce and custody laws (Messener
1998, 266) . This decade ofmen’s rights activism was
marked by claims that “men are the true victims of
prostitution, pornography, dating rituals, sexist
media conventions, divorce settlements, false rape
accusations, sexual harassment, and even domestic
violence” (Messener 1998, 266) . MRA discourse
occupies a fantasy space of victimhood for men;
women are systemically privileged at the expense of
men—claims that are not reflected in research. MRA
discourse is often criticized for displaying a blatant
disregard for widely accepted and supported
sociological, economic, and psychological studies
that dispute its claims (Gotell & Dutton 2016, 66) .
Instead of relying on data to support its claims,
MRA discourse is built largely upon anecdotal
stories—or personal narratives—as well as with
scientifically flawed studies (Messener 1998; Allan
2015) .
In additional to personal narratives, men’s rights
activists sometimes invoke colourful metaphors to
support their claims. For example, MRA leader Rich
Doyle said:
Divorce courts are frequently like slaughter-
houses, with about as much compassion and
talent. They function as collection agencies for
lawyer fees, however outrageous, stealing
children and extorting money from men in
ways blatantly unconstitutional. . . . Men are
regarded as mere guests in their own homes,
evictable any time at the whims ofwives and
judges. Men are driven from home and
children against their wills; then when unable
to stretch paychecks far enough to support
two households are termed ‘runaway fathers.’
Contrary to all principles of justice, men are
thrown in prison for inability to pay alimony
and support, however unreasonable or unfair
the ‘Obligation.’ (in Messener 1998, 267-268) .
This narrative is Kafkaesque in its use of exaggerated
imagery that seeks to affect the reader and garner
emotional support for men’s rights activists; it is more
metaphorical than reflective of reality.
Men’s Right’s Discourses on Sexual Assault
& Sexual Assault Allegations
I focus here on MRA discourses of sexual assault and
sexual assault allegations partially due to the political
climate proceeding the Ghomeshi court decision (i.e. ,
before 2016) , the lack-lustre mandated sexual assault
policies that Ontario universities adopted in January
2017 (Wronko 2016), and my own experiences with
sexual assault, popular discourses of assault, and men’s
rights activists.
Indeed, other feminist scholars have noted that the
issue of sexual assault has re-emerged (if it ever really
went away) with public allegations against well-
known media personalities such as Ghomeshi and
with publicized sexual assault scandals at several
universities,4 such as Dalhousie, the University of
Ottawa, York University, Queen’s University, and the
University of British Columbia to name only a few
within the Canadian context (Gotell & Dutton 2016,
66) .
Despite the prominence of MRA discourse and
activism, there is scarce literature available on the
subject, particularly regarding sexual violence. In their
study using discourse analysis of popular MRA
websites, Lise Gotell and Emily Dutton state:
The only explorations ofMRA activism
surrounding sexual violence, to date, have been
journalistic accounts. Here we examine popular
MRA websites to reveal a set of interrelated
claims about sexual violence, including: that
sexual violence, like domestic violence, is a
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gender-neutral problem; that feminists are
responsible for erasing men’s experiences of
sexual assault; that false allegations of sexual
assault against men are widespread; and that
rape culture is a feminist-produced moral
panic. (2016, 66)
Gotell and Dutton also rightly assess that this kind
of research is challenging for feminist scholars and
activists due to the misogynist content and need for
self-care (2016, 66) , and risk to personal safety (see
Matak 2014) . While it is important to conduct
research on MRA discourses and activism, it seems
unjust that this should predominately fall to feminist
and gender scholars, whose political positions will
likely be seen as biasing the research, and that
feminists not only have to prove their own theories
but be responsible for disproving counter-claims that
often have no methodological rigor themselves.
MRA discourses try to reduce feminist critiques of
rape culture to so-called political correctness. This
discourse understands anti-rape feminism as
attempting to conflate bad sex as rape and inciting a
moral panic, as Gotell and Dunton write:
They criticized a sexually correct form of
feminism that they saw as convincing women
to redefine bad sex as rape, in the process
manufacturing a crisis. These polemical claims
took the form of an ideological battle waged
through the media and were eagerly taken up
in a cultural context by those anxious to put
to rest the troubling claims of anti-rape
feminists. (Gotell & Dutton 2016, 68)
To reiterate these authors’ last point, cultural
hegemony needs to believe that rape is not a regular
occurrence for a significant portion of women in
Canada, however, a woman in Canada is likely to be
sexually assaulted at least once in their life. There is a
wilful cultural ignorance to sexual violence in
Canada and has become clear following the
Ghomeshi trial.
Realities ofSexual Assault
In Canada, largely due to feminist law reform and
litigation, there is an affirmative consent standard:
“There is no implied consent in Canadian law; silence
and ambiguity cannot be taken as indicating
agreement to engage in sex; and consent must be
active through the sexual encounter” (Gotell &
Dutton 2016, 66) . Thus, the legal definition of sexual
assault is any sexual contact in which someone is not
freely agreeing to engage in the activity. On the other
hand, false accusations of sexual assault are very rare
(Ferguson & Malouff 2016) . There are high
prevalence rates of sexual assault, high rates of under-
reporting, high rates of police un-founding
accusations, and low conviction rates of those that do
end up going to trial, resulting in what is known as
the “justice gap” (Gotell & Dutton 2016, 67) . Those
who experience sexual assault are unlikely to come
forward precisely because they will be accused of
making false allegations, not being believed,
stigmatized and vilified.
Official government statistics and social science data
demonstrate the “pervasiveness of sexual violence, as
well as the gendered character of the crimes of rape
and sexual assault” (Gotell & Dutton 2016, 73) .
However, MRAs tend to “cherry-pick findings” out of
research in order to depoliticize and portray sexual
violence as a gender-neutral issue (Gotell & Dutton
2016, 73) . What is perhaps most frightening about
MRA discourses on sexual assault is how it attempts
to minimize and deny the pervasiveness and gendered
realities of sexual violence; their justifications for why
assault happens are similar to the denials and
justifications deployed by abusive men (Gotell &
Dutton 2016, 73) . Just as Joseph K. rationalizes his
behaviour and deflects any accountability in his arrest,
MRA discourses resist pro-active approaches to end
sexual violence in favour of reactive and defensive
politics (Allan 2015, 25) .
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Analysis ofThe Trial
Franz Kafka
Literary scholars have noted that Kafka was not
primarily an author of the absurd and bizarre but of
writing about the fear of the absurd and bizarre
(Nasir 2012; Virgil 2005, 364) . Because of
outspoken philosophical interest in Kafka, many
scholars have misappropriated and interpreted his
work as “a universal expression of the ‘human
condition’” (Bogaerts 2014, 71 ) . Similarly, MRAs
are popularly interpreted as marginalized men who
feel that they have not or cannot obtain the power
and prestige associated with hegemonic
understandings of masculinity. In his biographical
information about Kafka, Malcolm Warner notes
that Kafka had been the victim of “‘Angst’ for many
years, as well as ‘stress’ and even ‘pain’” (2007,
1020) . It is not a leap to assume that Kafka would
have probably felt alienated as a German-speaking
Jew living in interwar Prague (Steiner 1968, x) . In
the introduction to the 1968 edition of the novel,
George Steiner describes Kafka: “In respect, both of
Jewish ideals and of his father’s brutally voiced
expectations, Kafka pronounced himself an abject
failure, a deserter. . . . Franz existed shadowlike. His
vehemently gnarled relationships with women—the
lengthy engagement to Felicie Bauer, his love for
Milena—aborted (1968, x) .”
Thus, we can see how Kafka himself can be read as a
man failing to meet the impossible expectations of
the patriarchal ideals of masculinity. Of particular
interest to my analysis are his two notable failed
relationships with women; his engagement, while
lengthy, never culminated in marriage and his love
for Milena is described with the heavy adjective
“aborted.” While I am not claiming that Kafka
would be an MRA if he were living in the
contemporary context, I am suggesting that his
biography can be read as similarly and
sympathetically to those who are involved in anti-
feminist activisms.
Kafka’s The Trial (1925) has been popularly
interpreted as an allegory for modern state power and
alienation (Potter 2000, 253) . The interpretation of
The Trial that I find most compelling and useful is
that of Jacques Derrida. As Potter notes:
Derrida, like the prison chaplain in The Trial,
argues that the way we stand before the Law is
similar to the way we stand before a text. Both
demand to be interpreted, but both actually do
not refer to anything beyond themselves.
Rather than mediating a relationship to some
prior moral or ethical code, our singular
relationship to the structure or idiom of the
Law is that ethical code. (2000, 254)
Scholars of various fields stand before The Trial and
with whatever background and baggage they bring
with them, they try to assemble a great truth or
meaning. Certainly, Kafka never intended to tell a
satirical story of men’s rights activism (nor could he
have probably imagined the second wave feminism
which would pre-empt it) . However, I take Potter’s
reading of Derrida as permission to use this text to
tell a story that serves my purposes. Potter suggests
that rather than seeing the confrontation within the
story as containing “the conditions of ethical
knowledge, then, this encounter might more
importantly be about a struggle for recognition, in
which the law is not something to be discovered, but
might also be that which needs to be changed” (2000,
254) . Subsequently, I contend that not only does The
Trial reveal the surrealism of MRA discourses, but
also the need for cultural recognition of the epidemic
of gendered sexual violence.
Rachel Potter notes that this parable can also “be seen
as the starting point for other kinds of reflections,
about the different kinds of law and reason which
seem to be referred to in the story, and about the
relationship between modernist writing and the Law”
(2000, 254) . I agree with Potter on this suggestion
and indeed see The Trial as about sexual assault/rape
law and as an allegory of the complex discourses
which inform ones position on sexual assault as a
social issue.
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Joseph K.
Whether a reader embraces Joseph K. as the
protagonist or antagonist of The Trial depends on
whether one believes him to be innocent or guilty.
Indeed, as Goodhart and Ward note, what is most
unclear is the degree to which Joseph K. is a victim.
This is because “In the case of The Trial, what is
most unclear is precisely the degree to which Joseph
K. is really a victim. The fundamental ambiguity of
this novel pervaded by ambiguity has to do with the
innocence of the protagonist” (Goodhart & Ward
2004, 65) . In a book where nearly everything is
unclear or ambiguous, the greatest mystery of all is
not what he might have done, but whether or not he
really did it, as this profoundly changes the affect
and interpretation of the novel.
One clue to the innocence or guilt of Joseph K. is in
the translation ofThe Trial from its original German
into English. Goodhart and Ward note that, “those
able to read the original German text would notice
that the word ‘muste’ . . . more probably indicates
that this is the speculation [as to his innocence] of
the character rather than the narrator, and therefore
possibly self-serving” (Goodhart and Ward 2004,
66) . Indeed, many literary critics have argued that it
would be naïve of the reader to agree with K. that he
is in fact innocent (Goodhart & Ward 2004, 66) .
Would The Trial be sufficiently Kafkaesque if the
narrator was indeed reliable? Or is it a question of
authenticity wherein Joseph K. believes himself to be
innocent regardless of whether he truly is? Is Kafka
trying to con the reader with a con-artist
protagonist? If K. is guilty, as I suggest, there exists a
possible reading where he is in fact guilty of sexual
assault. The basis of this literary accusation draws on
Joseph K.’s interactions with female characters in the
story, and particularly with Fräulein Bürstner.
What is striking about all of the female characters in
The Trial is that they are in love with or at least
extraordinarily endeared to Joseph K. Young or old
married or single, all women adore K. and will do
anything for him. The one possible exception to this
is Fräulein Bürstner,5 a young neighbouring tenant
in the boarding house where Joseph K. resides.
Fräulein Bürstner only appears at the beginning and
(potentially) at the very end of the novel. Like K.
himself, Fräulein Bürstner is a character about which
little is known. For example in this passage, K. claims
to both intimately know the inside of her bedroom
and yet barely know the woman: “This room, as K.
knew quite well, had recently been taken by a
Fräulein Bürstner, a typist, who went very early to
work, came home late, and with whom he had
exchanged little more than a few words in passing"
(Kafka 1968, 10) . While this could be potentially
attribute to K.’s knowledge of the room via a previous
tenant or its presumed similarity to his own, it is odd
that in a single sentence he claims to be intimately
familiar with a room belonging to a woman, but not
the woman herself.
Joseph K. asks their landlady whether Fräulein
Bürstner is home under the premise he wants to
apologize that the police-like people who came to
inform him of his arrest did so in her room (for an
unknown reason) . His reaction to the landlady’s
response—that Fräulein Bürstner is in fact out at the
theatre—is also peculiar: “‘It’s of no consequence,’
said K., turning to the door, his head sunk on his
breast. ‘I only wanted to apologize to her for having
borrowed her room today” (Kafka 1968, 20-21 ) . The
description of Joseph K. dropping his head to his
breast suggests significant disappointment at Fräulein
Bürstner being out. If he barely knows this woman
and only wants to apologize for an inconvenience she
knows nothing about, why would he be so
disappointed? I argue that this is additional evidence
that suggests K. is not honest with the reader about
his relationship to/with Fräulein Bürstner or his
intentions with her. Additionally, when the landlady
raises concerns about the respectability of Fräulein
Bürstner regarding her late hours and outings with
multiple men, K. defends her honour with an
intensity that would be unusual for a near-stranger:
‘I have no wish to speak ill of Fräulein Bürstner,
she is a dear, good girl, kind, decent, punctual,
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industrious, I admire all these qualities in her,
but one thing is undeniable, she should have
more pride, should keep more to herself. This
month I have met her twice already on
outlying streets, and each time with a different
gentleman.’ . . . ‘You’re quite on the wrong
track, said K., with a sudden fury which he
was scarcely able to hide. . . . I know Fräulein
Bürstner very well, there isn’t a word of truth
in what you say.’ (Kafka 1968, 21 -22)
I argue that this passage demonstrates that Joseph K.
is more attached or invested in Fräulein Bürstner
than he has given the reader any reason to believe.
Indeed, he spends the next two hours staying awake
just waiting for her to come home so he can
approach her and talk to her and even then he is not
honest about this with the reader:
Until about eleven he lay quietly on the sofa
smoking a cigar. But then he could not endure
lying there any longer and took a step or two
into the entrance hall, as if that would make
Fräulein Bürstner come all the sooner. He felt
no special desire to see her, he could not even
remember exactly how she looked but he wanted
to talk to her now, and he was exasperated that
her being so late should further disturb and
derange the end of such a day. She was to
blame, too, for the fact that he had not eaten any
supper and that he had put offthe visit to Elsa
he had proposed making that evening. (Kafka
1968, 22-23; emphasis added)
It may strike the reader as strange that K. claims no
special desire to see Fräulein Bürstner and yet has
reorganized his evening around the possibility of it
occurring. It is unsettling that he goes so far as to
blame her for his not eating and putting off what
can be presumed to be a sexual rendezvous with
Elsa,6 as if she unknowingly has immense influence
over his actions and decisions.
When Fräulein Bürstner eventually returns home,
she makes up excuses to not have to talk to Joseph
K., but eventually gives into his persistence and lets
him into her apartment (Kafka 1968, 24) . After
listening to his retelling of the events from that
morning and asking whether she believes he is guilty
or not she says to K. that she does not know if he is
innocent and, further, that she does not really know
him (Kafka 1968, 25) . While the text provides several
suggestions that Joseph K. is perhaps an unreliable
narrator, there is no indication to the reader about
Fräulein Bürstner, and thus we can safely deduce that
she and Joseph K. barely know each other.
While Joseph K. is in Fräulein Bürstner’s apartment it
appears that K. is comfortable and that Fräulein
Bürstner is uncomfortable, and despite it being her
apartment, K. is in a position of power or control
over the situation. This particular passage
demonstrates this tension: “He wanted to move about
and yet he did not want to leave. ‘I’m tired,’ said
Fräulein Bürstner. ‘You come home so late,’ said K.
‘So you’ve gone the length of reproaching me, and I
deserve it, too, for I should never have let you in. And
there was no need for it, either, that’s evident’" (Kafka
1968, 26) .
Instead of perceiving that perhaps he should retire to
his own room at such a late hour when a lady is tired
(and perhaps that he gained entry under misleading
pretenses) he forces himself on her:
“I’m coming,” K. said, rushed out, seized her,
and kissed her first on the lips, then all over the
face, like some thirsty animal lapping greedily
at the spring of long-sought fresh water. Finally,
he kissed her on the neck, right on the throat,
and kept his lips there for a long time. . . . He
wanted to call Fräulein Bürstner by her first
name, but he did not know what it was. (Kafka
1968, 29)
Not only is the description of his scene wholly
unromantic, but also wholly nonconsensual. Not only
is her reaction not described, as though it was
inconsequential, the animalistic quality of the attack
is frightening. The detail that K. wanted to call
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Fräulein Bürstner by her first name, but he did not
know what it was, again speaks to the unfamiliarity
of their relationship and Joseph K.’s for intimacy
with Fräulein Bürstner that clearly is not there. A
majority of sexual assaults are not committed by
strangers prowling in the bushes but, as in my
reading of The Trial, are actually committed by
people known to the victim (McDaniel & Rodriguez
2017; Pazzani 2007) . If we are to address sexual
violence, then we must take seriously the
complexities of assault that include
misunderstandings of how is granted consent and
what constitutes consent (Decker & Baroni 2011 ) .
Men’s rights activist discourses claim that most men
understand rape to be a horrible crime. However, as
Gotell and Dutton note, “the issue underlying this
emphasis on rape as a widely condemned crime is
not really whether people view rape as right or
wrong. Instead, it is that rape is not seen as rape”
(2016, 75) . Without reinforcing a hierarchy of
sexual violence, I want to be clear that I am not
alleging K.’s described behaviour as rape but as
sexual assault (or given the context in which the
book was written, if not assault, something that was
inappropriate) . Further, Joseph K. does not seem to
understand his actions as such. This MRA discourse
has the effect of narrowing the category of “real
rape” (or real sexual assault) to violent stranger rape;
despite knowing that acquaintance sexual violence is
significantly more common: “The effect is to draw a
clear line between rapists and ordinary men and
between everyday heterosexuality and rape” (Gotell
& Dutton 2016, 75) . When K. talks his way into
Fräulein Bürstner’s apartment, ignores her
suggestions that he return to his own room and let
her sleep, and then forces himself upon her, K. is
committing sexual assault.
After K. assaults Fräulein Bürstner and returns to his
own room, he reflects on what he has just done, but
does not have regrets about his conduct. Rather, he
is pleased with himself: “Shortly afterwards K. was
in his bed. He fell asleep almost at once, but before
doing so he thought a little about his behaviors, he
was pleased with it, yet surprised that he was not still
more pleased; he was seriously concerned for Fräulein
Bürstner because of the Captain (Kafka 1968, 30) .”
The only concern K. has for Fräulein Bürstner is that
if the Captain in the adjoining room had heard a man
in her room, he would inform the landlady, which
could potentially lead to her eviction based on the
immorality of an unmarried woman with a man in
her room. He has no concern for how Fräulein
Bürstner may have felt about being sexually assaulted
or may be feeling after the fact.
As K. is being lead to the place where he is to be
executed for his (unknown) crime he thinks that he
sees Fräulein Bürstner in the distance:
And then before them Fräulein Bürstner
appeared, mounting a small flight of steps
leading into the square from a low-lying side-
street. It was not quite certain that it was she,
but the resemblance was close enough.
Whether it were really Fräulein Bürstner or not,
however, did not matter to K.; the important
thing as that he suddenly realized the futility of
his resistance. (Kafka 1968, 225)
It is striking that it is this sudden reappearance of
Fräulein Bürstner that makes Joseph K. suddenly
realize that his struggle against the Law and his
executioners is futile. I suggest that Fräulein Bürstner
returns as the specter of Joseph K.’s guilt and that
perhaps this guilt is rooted in his sexual assaults
against women.7
The Trial and the Ghomeshi Verdict
The non-guilty verdict of the Ghomeshi trial and the
resulting dismissal of charges may have felt very
Kafkaesque for many feminists, anti-sexual violence
activists, and women across Canada. Despite the
seriousness and number of the allegations (four
counts of sexual assault and one count of choking to
overcome resistance) that were against the former
CBC radio host, many commentators have been
steadfast in their assertions that “the case does not
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indicate that anything is ‘broken’ in our criminal
justice system. Instead, they say, it’s a great
system—possibly the best in the world. It just
doesn’t work that well for sexual assault, they
acknowledge” (Crew et al. 2016, 1 ) . If the criminal
justice system does not work well for dealing with
serious violent crimes that effect 39% of women at
least once in their lifetime (Crew et al. 2016, 1 ) ,
how can it be said to be anything but broken?
MRA discourses about sexual assault, as discussed
above, are largely rooted in the argument that sexual
assault is rare, false allegations are common, that
women should be more pro-active in avoiding being
assaulted, or in some combination of these positions.
Indeed, if “we know that 997 of 1 ,000 men who
commit this crime can expect to be unsanctioned
what do we tell men? Surely not ‘don’t rape’” (Crew
et al. 2016, 1 ) . In The Trial, if the reader is of the
perspective I am suggesting, and Joseph K. has been
unknowingly accused of sexually assaulting a woman
and blindly convicted based on the allegation, the
opposite is true in reality, where women can
formally charge and face her perpetrator in court
and he still may not be found guilty. The court is
interested in decisions and not justice: just because
someone is not found guilty in a court of law does
not mean a sexual assault did not take place. A court
decision is based upon the rules of the game of law
and who can construct (or deconstruct as was the
case with the women’s testimonies against
Ghomeshi) a narrative.
The Ghomeshi judgment does not cite any case law
on the meaning of consent or how to assess
credibility of consent (Crew et al. 2016, 1 ) . Justice
William Horkin’s reasoning has been critiqued as
“heavy on an assessment of the three complainants
behavior after the fact, ‘but light on the law’" (Crew
et al. 2016, 2) . There are a number of concerning
and surreal aspects to Justice Horkin’s decision on
the Ghomeshi case, which I argue are both
analogous to MRA discourses and surrealist in their
seeming removal from reality.
The first page of the Ghomeshi decision includes a
bold warning. Although a content warning may have
been appropriate, the warning pertains to a
publication ban regarding the identities of the victims
of sexual assault (R. v. Ghomeshi 2016, 1 ) .That the
publication ban would somehow protect the victims
seems misguided. Given the sheer intensity of the
media attention on this case and the fact that the
victims who came forward were open about their
identities with the media before going to the police,
the media and the public knew their identities
already.
Justice Horkin’s focus on the so-called celebrity status
of Ghomeshi (R. v. Ghomeshi 2016, 2-3) is both
reminiscent of MRA discourses about how women
seek out influential men both for sexual partners and
for victims to extort and blackmail. Justice Horkin’s
comments imply a reverse onus: that women would
somehow be in a position of power to exploit men’s
vulnerability as a celebrity for her own gain, as
opposed to a celebrity being able to use their
influence and public image to potentially increase the
difficulty of levying accusations against them.
Similarly, the Justice’s reference to “flirtatious emails”
(R. v. Ghomeshi 2016, 7-8) implies that this was
somehow uncommon despite Ghomeshi’s celebrity
status and carries an innuendo that suggests the
victims invited both sexual attention and potential
violence.
Perhaps the most Kafkaesque element of the
Ghomeshi decision is the Justice’s condemnation and
articulation of the female accusers as a “team” and of
their “possible collusion” (R. v. Ghomeshi 2016, 15,
18) . Just as Joseph K. demonstrates severe paranoia
that everyone is somehow involved in his case and/or
out to condemn him, and as MRAs believe women to
be orchestrating a conspiracy against men via feminist
ideologies, Justice Horkin’s articulation of solidarity
between female survivors of the same violent
perpetrator suggests neither a team-building exercise
nor collusion. If someone does not understand their
behaviour as sexual assault, violent, or problematic
then how can they be expected to stop or change their
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pattern of behaviours? Following this logic, should it
not be surprising that multiple victims came forward
with similar allegations?
Finally, in his conclusion of the Ghomeshi verdict,
Justice Horkin reiterates MRA discourse that the
courts must be “very cautious in assessing the
evidence of complainants in sexual assault and abuse
cases” (R. v. Ghomeshi 2016, 23) , even though the
evidence required to move a complaint from the
police report to the trial was not already required to
be more significant than is available for most
accusations of sexual assault. This rhetoric suggests
that perhaps false allegations are commonplace, or at
least common enough to be an issue that judges
must be actively conscious of when making their
decisions. Justice Horkin summarizes: “Courts must
guard against applying false stereotypes concerning
the expected conduct of complainants. I have a firm
understanding that the reasonableness of reactive
human behavior in the dynamics of a relationship
can be variable and unpredictable. However, the
twists and turns of the complainant’s evidence in this
trial, illustrate the need to be vigilant in avoiding the
equally dangerous false assumption that sexual
assault complainants are always truthful” (R. v.
Ghomeshi 2016, 23-24) .
Perhaps Justice Horkin is unknowingly engaging in
“double-think”:8 despite his assertion that courts
must not apply false stereotypes of victims expected
behaviours, he does just that throughout his
decision. In a culture where victims of sexual assault
are rarely believed at any level (from the public to
the police to judges) , does anyone need to be
vigilant against assuming complainants are always
truthful? Or rather, do we need to be vigilant against
understanding real complaints as false accusations?
Conclusion
Felman sought to inspire a new model to perceive
legal events and an analytical tool that that serves
“not just to rethink the meaning of a legal case but
to displace the very terms and the very questions
through which we interpret cases, both in fiction and
in the reality of legal life” (2002, 56) . She did this by
demonstrating the traumatic repetition in between
and across Tolstoy’s The Kreutzer Sonata and the O. J
Simpson trial. In this paper, I have adapted her work
to read a new interpretation of Kafka’s The Trial via
men’s right activist discourses on sexual assault
allegations and the Ghomeshi verdict. I have
demonstrated the usefulness of Felman’s approach and
continued efforts to the “destabilization of the
boundaries that epistemologically define and separate
the territory of the Law from that of Literature"
(Felman 2002, 56) . While law and literature do not
aim for the same conclusion nor effect, both are
premised on the search for meaning and symbolic
understanding as a useful tool for imagining different
(and hopefully better) futures (Felman 2002, 54-55) .
If Canada is going to adequately address its
contemporary context of sexual violence and realise
its substantive equality, then the surrealism of MRA
discourses of sexual assault and assault allegations
need to be deconstructed and revealed as the fantasies
they are.
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1 . To recognise both feminism men’s rights as
complex and diverse social movements, and to pre-
empt criticism from MRAs, the discourses examined
in this paper predominantly came from the Canadian
Association for Equality (CAFE), Coalition of Free
Men, and the National Congress for Men, and span
from the 1960s to present day.
2. Men’s liberation remains a pro-feminist or anti-
sexist men’s movement that emphasizes, as it did then,
the importance of joining women to address
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